Félix Guattari



Guattari segna una rottura epistemologica con la psicoanalisi attaccando frontalmente il complesso di Edipo. L’inconscio non è più un teatro del desiderio familiare ma lo spazio di produzione sociale del desiderio. L’autore, attraverso uno studio approfondito delle famose pagine di Freud dedicate al complesso di Edipo, rintraccia i meccanismi sottili della prevaricazione autoritaria e gerarchica in difesa dello status quo; l’inconscio, con il padre della psicoanalisi, diventa un insieme di credenze e di rappresentazioni indotte. In questo modo il testo di Guattari affronta i limiti dei tradizionali discorsi teorici sulla psicoanalisi e propone una chiave interpretativa originale e tutt’ora ineguagliata. Il nodo principale su cui si sofferma Guattari è un modo di rileggere la schizofrenia non solo come malattia mortale, ma come tentativo disperato di comunicazione di un malessere individuale, che come tale potrebbe trasformarsi in una possibilità di accoglimento dei molteplici esseri che convivono in ognuno. Scritte nei primi anni Settanta, ben prima della attuali crisi che attraversano la psicoanalisi sia come pratica che come disciplina scientifica, le pagine di Guattari si sono dimostrate profetiche. Questo volume aiuta anche a meglio comprendere L’antiedipo, altra opera composta da Guattari assieme a Gilles Deleuze. I due testi sono forse le opere più significative dell’antipsichiatria.

Félix Guattari (1930-1992) è stato non solo filosofo, ma anche medico e psicoanalista. Aderisce alla scuola freudiana di Parigi sotto la guida di Jacques Lacan. Riconosciuto universalmente come uno dei padri dell’antipsichiatria, Guattari poté elaborare le sue teorie all’ospedale di La Borde, uno dei principali centri psichiatrici francesi che diresse fino alla prematura scomparsa. Guattari fu anche uno dei fondatori in Francia del movimento ecologista, cui contribuì sia sul versante organizzativo che teorico. Dopo il Sessantotto Guattari intraprese una attiva e straordinaria collaborazione con il grande filosofo Gilles Deleuze con il quale pubblicò opere decisive come: L’antiedipo, 1972;Kafka. Per una letteratura minore, 1975; Millepiani, 1980; Che cos’è la filosofia?,1991.


Deleuze and Cinema The Film Concepts - Felicity Colman - Berg Publishers, Usa, 2011

Deleuze and Cinema
The Film Concepts
Felicity Colman 

Gilles Deleuze published two radical books on film:Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Engaging with a wide range of film styles, histories and theories, Deleuze's writings treat film as a new form of philosophy. This ciné-philosophy offers a startling new way of understanding the complexities of the moving image, its technical concerns and constraints as well as its psychological and political outcomes.

Deleuze and Cinema presents a step-by-step guide to the key concepts behind Deleuze's revolutionary theory of the cinema. Exploring ideas through key directors and genres, Deleuze's method is illustrated with examples drawn from American, British, continental European, Russian and Asian cinema.

Deleuze and Cinema provides the first introductory guide to Deleuze's radical methodology for screen analysis. It will be invaluable for students and teachers of Film, Media and Philosophy.

About the Author/Editor

Felicity Colman is Senior Lecturer in Film and Media Studies, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.


0. Introduction
1. Ciné-system
2. Movement
3. Frame, shot and cut
4. Montage
5. Perception
6. Affect
7. Action
8. TransSemiotics
9. Sign [vector]
10. Time
11. Politics
12. Topology
13. Thought
14. Conclusion: Ciné-ethics
Glossary of Deleuze's key cinematographic terms


Evil Media - Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey - MIT Press, Usa, October 2012

Evil Media
Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey

Evil Media develops a philosophy of media power that extends the concept of media beyond its tried and trusted use in the games of meaning, symbolism, and truth. It addresses the gray zones in which media exist as corporate work systems, algorithms and data structures, twenty-first century self-improvement manuals, and pharmaceutical techniques. Evil Media invites the reader to explore and understand the abstract infrastructure of the present day. From search engines to flirting strategies, from the value of institutional stupidity to the malicious minutiae of databases, this book shows how the devil is in the details.

The title takes the imperative “Don’t be evil” and asks, what would be done any differently in contemporary computational and networked media were that maxim reversed.

Media here are about much more and much less than symbols, stories, information, or communication: media do things. They incite and provoke, twist and bend, leak and manage. In a series of provocative stratagems designed to be used, Evil Media sets its reader an ethical challenge: either remain a transparent intermediary in the networks and chains of communicative power or become oneself an active, transformative medium.

About the Authors

Matthew Fuller is David Gee Reader in Digital Media at the Centre for Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths College, University of London. He is the author of Behind the Blip: Essays on the Culture of Software and Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture (MIT Press, 2005) and editor of Software Studies: A Lexicon (MIT Press, 2008).

Andrew Goffey is a Senior Lecturer in Media, Culture, and Communication at Middlesex University, London. He is the coeditor, with Éric Alliez, of The Guattari Effect and the translator of Isabelle Stengers and Philippe Pignarre's Capitalist Sorcery, of Félix Guattari's Schizoanalytic Cartographies, and of work by Maurizio Lazzarato, Barbara Cassin, and Etienne Balibar. He is also coeditor of the journal Computational Culture.

Read more on MIT website


Digital Contagions A Media Archaeology of Computer Viruses - Jussi Parikka - Peter Lang Publishing, Uk, 2007

Digital Contagions is the first book to offer a comprehensive and critical analysis of the culture and history of the computer virus phenomenon. The book maps the anomalies of network culture from the angles of security concerns, the biopolitics of digital systems, and the aspirations for artificial life in software. The genealogy of network culture is approached from the standpoint of accidents that are endemic to the digital media ecology. Viruses, worms, and other software objects are not, then, seen merely from the perspective of anti-virus research or practical security concerns, but as cultural and historical expressions that traverse a non-linear field from fiction to technical media, from net art to politics of software. Jussi Parikka mobilizes an extensive array of source materials and intertwines them with an inventive new materialist cultural analysis. Digital Contagionsdraws from the cultural theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Friedrich Kittler, and Paul Virilio, among others, and offers novel insights into historical media analysis.

Jussi Parikka is Reader in Media & Design at Winchester School of Art (University of Southampton). He is the author of Insect Media (2010) and co-editor of The Spam Book (2009) and Media Archaeology (2011). Parikka's homepage is http://www.jussiparikka.net.

«Inspired by the work of Paul Virilio, Friedrich Kittler, and Gilles Deleuze, this book chronicles the contemporary digital landscape through the menagerie of email worms and computer viruses that infect and define it. A self-described media archeologist, Jussi Parikka is both theoretically nuanced and technically detailed, a welcome relief coming on the heels of dotcom hysteria over digital hygiene. The result is a becoming-viral of today's technological culture. It is essential reading for anyone infected by the digital contagion.» 
(Alexander R. Galloway, Assistant Professor, Department of Culture and Communication, New York University; Author of 'Protocol and Gaming')
«'Digital Contagions' is the first book to look at the computer virus as a historical and cultural phenomenon, rather than simply as a technological issue. It brilliantly recounts the history of the emergence of such viruses in the context of other epidemics, and how these different kinds of contagions are ineluctably bound together in our technologized, digital culture. The book is an essential text for helping us come to terms with the massive changes this emerging culture is bringing about.» 

(Charlie Gere, Reader in New Media Research, Lancaster University; Author of 'Digital Culture' and 'Art, Time and Technology')

Read more on PLP website


Erarta Galleries Presents Revision DNA By Andrey Gorbunov @ London, Berkeley Square - 9 October to 17 November 2012

Erarta Galleries London is delighted to present Revision DNA by Andrey Gorbunov. Marking a break with his earlier more painterly approach to image making, Gorbunov’s new work questions the relationship that links art and science and our lives with technology,  asking if it is possible to assume that we are dealing with two opposing factors. On the one hand, the positive and confirmed structure of scientific knowledge and the ordered binary coding of the internet, and, on the other, the intuitive nature of art produced by the irrationality of biological man. Where science is to be considered the product of pure rationalism, the result of procedures amply verified, the search for unequivocal truths, certain and impossible to confute, Gorbunov asks if this rationalism translates to the virtual world of the Internet? Are our verifiable virtual constructs of self more real than our physical bodily being, and should the Internet be evaluated as a product of mathematics and science or as an organism growing and evolving under its own initiative?
Observing the monumental canvases of Gorbunov we can immediately and easily understand his vision of contemporary life and culture. The virtual world has become an integral part of each of us, similar to a new dimension influencing our social and biological rhythms. It is impossible to imagine the world without computer technologies today; everyday we immerse ourselves more and more deeply as network chats supersede actual human interaction and our Facebook and Twitter profiles grow. Not only have our moods, but also our lives, started to depend on the number of comments and “likes” our virtual egos successfully amass. Thus, contemporary culture is not a culture divided between ‘ars’ and ‘scientia’, or life and technology, but rather it is conflated into a ‘technoculture’ – a hybrid where diversity and quantity prevails over genuine identity. Gorbunov adopts a focused vision of the relationship between art and science, life and virtual life: No longer are we dealing with opposites in a dialectical vision, a view which appears more than ever superseded, but with complementary, interacting and intersecting aspects of a futuristic civilisation.
The Virus paintings that make up the exhibition Revision DNA draw a parallel between biological and computer viruses, and Gorbunov highlights the similarities between man and the internet, both living entities that grow and change daily, and both vulnerable to infections. Scanning the QR codes in the paintings will reveal information about notorious computer viruses, but all computer specific terms have been removed – the affect of these viruses is human. Ironically, QR codes may become the malicious points of infection for future viruses, as reading the codes puts the privacy of the user at risk by “attagging” the identity of user. Though science has recognised the truths of nature, it had abstained from modifying them for instrumental aims, but in contemporary technoculture, in genetic engineering and biotechnologies, the object of scientific research is no longer sacred and untouchable, the essence of truth, but an object that can be manipulated and transformed, by means of experimentation by those studying it. Similarly, in the macrocosm of the Internet, and our engagement with it and use of it, Gorbunov questions the balance of power – who is using whom and to what end?

Contact: Beth Morrow Tel: +44 (0) 20 7499 7861
E-mail: beth@erartagalleries.com

Andrey Gorbunov
Andrey Gorbunov is a graduate of the Nizhniy Novgorod Art College and St. Petersburg’s esteemed Mukhina Art Academy, where he now teaches in the monumental and decorative painting departments. Gorbunov has exhibited extensively throughout Russia and his paintings can be found in private collections in Russia, the UK and the USA.
Erarta Galleries: London | New York | Zurich | St Petersburg
8 Berkeley Street, London W1J 8DN.

Golsmiths Event: Virality and Evil Media presentations @ London, Goldsmiths, 22nd October 2012

If you're in London in October you may be interested in this event at Goldsmiths to mark the release of Evil Media, Virality and the next issue of Computational Culture. 
It's the first of a number of events related to Virality I'll be posting about. Computational Culture, Issue Two, Virality, Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks, by Tony D. Sampson Evil Media, by Matthew Fuller & Andrew Goffey 

22nd October 6pm Room RHB 342 Goldsmiths New Cross (Free, all welcome!) 

To celebrate these publications, informal presentations will be made by the authors of Virality and Evil Media and contributors to Computational Culture. 'Computational Culture' is an online open-access peer-reviewed journal of inter-disciplinary enquiry into the nature of cultural computational objects, practices, processes and structures. The new issue presents articles by Carlos Barreneche, Jennifer Gabrys, Robert W. Gehl & Sarah Bell, Shintaro Miyazaki, Bernhard Rieder, Bernard Stiegler, Annette Vee and reviews by Chiara Bernardi, KevinHamilton, Boris Ružiæ, Felix Stalder and an anonymous contributor. In 'Virality' Tony D. Sampson presents a contagion theory fit for the age of networks. Unlike memes and microbial contagions, Virality does not restrict itself to biological analogies and medical metaphors. It instead points toward a theory of contagious assemblages, events, and affects. For Sampson, contagion is not necessarily a positive or negative force of encounter; it is how society comes together and relates. [University of Minnesota Press] 'Evil Media' invites the reader to explore and understand the abstract infrastructure of the present day. From search engines to flirting strategies, from the value of institutional stupidity to the malicious minutiae of databases, this book shows how the devil is in the details. The title takes the imperative “Don’t be evil” and asks, what would be done any differently in contemporary computational and networked media were that maxim reversed. [The MIT Press] In 'Sensing an Experimental Forest', her article for 'Computational Culture' 2, Jennifer Gabrys discusses fieldwork conducted at an environmental sensor test site, the James Reserve in California. The use of wireless sensor networks to study environmental phenomena is an increasingly prevalent practice, and ecological applications of sensors have been central to the development of wireless sensor networks that now extend to numerous ‘participatory’ applications. 

Virality http://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/virality 
Evil Media http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=12995 Computational Culture http://www.computationalculture.net/

pic: Andrey Gorbunov - Virus No.1 - Mixed Media


Michael Riedel's “Texte zur Kunst” @ the Schirn Kunsthalle in Frankfurt

Following his first retrospective “Texte zur Kunst” at the Schirn Kunsthalle in Frankfurt, Michael Riedel will be reading from the exhibiton catalogue on Friday, September 28th. The reading will take place in the studio of the design agency Double Standards, who also created the layout for the book. After the talk, a book signing will round-off the event.
Frankfurt-based artist Michael Riedel has been investigating the issue of reproduction and repetition, working with recorded conversations, films and performances, and with the exhibitions of other artists’ works. His creative method is based on the combination of these elements into ever new variations and on the transformation of one medium into another. 

Read more on Gestalten website


French Theory Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. all’assalto dell’America - François Cusset - Il Saggiatore, Ita, 11 ottobre 2012

Sapevate che Michel Foucault è stato negli Usa un’icona delle battaglie per i diritti civili, mentre Jacques Derrida diventava una celebrità accademica senza eguali? Che Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari hanno ispirato i precursori di Internet e i primi deejay di musica elettronica? E che la fantascienza americana, dal romanzo cyberpunk alla saga di Matrix, ha attinto a piene mani dal pensiero di Jean Baudrillard? Dopo aver incrociato a New York la controcultura dei mitici Seventies, le opere dei filosofi francesi del poststrutturalismo sono entrate nei dipartimenti di letteratura delle università americane e hanno sovvertito tutti i canoni del sapere, abbattendo il muro che separava cultura accademica e cultura pop. Riscoperte e reinterpretate come base teorica per le lotte identitarie di fine secolo, hanno poi fecondato il terreno da cui sono sbocciati i cultural studies, i gender studies e la critica multiculturalista. Decostruzionismo, biopotere, micropolitiche, si mulazione: French Theory ricostruisce la singolare evoluzione di questo pensiero iconoclasta, accolto con più successo oltreoceano che nella madrepatria. Un passaggio misconosciuto, eppure cruciale, dell’epoca contemporanea che ha mutato il paesaggio intellettuale, culturale e politico degli ultimi decenni. François Cusset, storico delle idee, è professore di Cultura americana all’Università di Nanterre. È autore di numerose pubblicazioni, fra cui Queer critics e À l’abri du déclin du monde.
Read more on Saggiatore website


Toni Negri e Michael Hardt - Questo non è un Manifesto (Serie bianca) (Italian Edition) - Feltrinelli, Ita, 9 ottobre 2012

Che sia giunto il momento di cambiare qualcosa, nel mondo in preda alla crisi globale, lo pensano davvero in molti. Che sia il caso di fare qualcosa per limitare tutti quei poteri dominanti, finanziari e politici, che ci hanno portato alla rovina sta diventando un sentimento condiviso. Con questo intenso pamphlet, Hardt e Negri entrano nel merito della questione: non si tratta più, infatti, di protestare, come hanno fatto in questi anni i movimenti di piazza, ma di costruire, facendo emergere principi e pratiche che possano tirarci fuori dall’impasse.Proprio i movimenti hanno messo in evidenza quelli che potrebbero essere i primi principi “costituenti” di un nuovo sistema. In primo luogo, il rifiuto della rappresentanza politica (composta da politici di professione e partiti politici) e la costruzione, in sua vece, di nuovi schemi di partecipazione democratica; poi la valorizzazione del “comune”, come sfera separata sia da quella privata sia da quella pubblica, statale; ma anche la ridefinizione di nuovi significati per il termine “libertà”, con la possibilità di attuare accordi politici per le moltitudini che eccedano ampiamente i limiti delle attuali costituzioni repubblicane.Questi nuovi principi derivano da una lunga elaborazione teorica e sono sempre più messi in pratica a vari livelli in tutto il mondo. L’obiettivo è adesso creare un potere costituente che organizzi queste relazioni rendendole durevoli, promuovendo innovazioni future e rimanendo aperto ai desideri della moltitudine. I movimenti hanno dichiarato una nuova indipendenza e a portarla avanti dovrà essere un potere costituente. Questo libro ci dice come.“Hardt e Negri sono di una straordinaria e rara razza: sono teorici della politica che credono fino in fondo nella gente, nel suo potere e nel suo buon senso nell’autogovernarsi. Il risultato sta in un matrimonio suggestivo di realismo e idealismo.” Naomi Klein, autrice di No Logo.

Antonio Negri (Padova 1933), tra i maggiori pensatori della dottrina dello stato a livello mondiale, è sempre stato coinvolto in modo attivo nei movimenti   di trasformazione della società. Ha insegnato nelle università di Padova e Paris VIII. Tra i suoi lavori più importanti: in collaborazione con Michael Hardt, Impero (Rizzoli 2002); Moltitudine (Rizzoli 2004); Comune(Rizzoli 2010); la trilogia di studi su Spinoza; Marx oltre Marx (Feltrinelli 1979, ora manifestolibri 1998); Il potere costituente. Saggio sulle alternative del moderno (SugarCo 1992). Per Feltrinelli ha scritto inoltre Goodbye Mr Socialism (2006) e Fabbrica di porcellana (2008).


The sacred dilemma of inoperosity. On Giorgio Agamben’s Opus Dei by Antonio Negri @ Uninomade website

The sacred dilemma of inoperosity. On Giorgio Agamben’s Opus Dei

With this book, the journey Agamben began with Homo Sacer seems to have come to an end. It was a long road, from the early ‘90s until today, nearly twenty years. An archeology of ontology conducted (with a rigor that not even the bizarre and misleading game of little numbers put in order over different stages of his research could render opaque) – up to the reopening of the problem of Sein. A dig that not even Heidegger (in the words of the author who claims to be a young student of the German philosopher) was able to complete – because here ontology is freed from any remaining “operativity” of every illusion that can be tied to will and control. What is left? “The philosophical question that appears is that of conceiving of an ontology beyond operativity and command, and an ethics and a politics totally freed from the concepts of duty and will”.
The demonstration that the ontology criticized by Heidegger is still, in the end, a theory of operativity and will is undoubtedly a true idea. Already Schürmann developed this idea when he criticized Sein as being the same idea of “archè” and therefore as indistinctness of beginning and command. Following the development and successive organization of this ontology of operativity, that from the Neo-Platonists to the fathers of the Church, from the Latin philosophers to Kant, from Aquinas to Heidegger, that proposes an idea of being that is completely assimilated to will/command, is Agamben’s task – here accomplished with great skill.
Aristotle, first of all. In his theory of virtue as habit, he could have ripped being from any aporetic propulsion toward virtue, thus freeing himself of any valorizing operativity: he doesn’t manage to do it, even through he is the one who, at the origins of metaphysics, conceived virtue as the relationship with privation and as inoperative ontological determination. But from here on out – according to Agamben – things went from bad to worse. In Christianity (once again the immersion of the relationship between Neo-Platonism and Patrology calls Agamben to this path) action and will begin to take over. We’ll leave it to the medievalists to judge whether this Agambenian analysis is correct: it is sufficient for us to follow the thread that does show an indubitable coherence. Now, the Aristotelian aporia  defined in the alternative of connecting (or not connecting) habit to virtue, being to duty, passivity to activity, doesn’t happen in Scholasticism. Critical habit is rather constitutively ordered to action and virtue no longer consists in being but in operating – and it is only through action that man can resemble God. So, in Thomas Aquinas: “It is this constitutive ordering of habit to action that the theory of virtue develops and is pushed to the extreme.” From now on, the history of metaphysics, stripped of critical archeology, shows a smooth continuity and reveals a sort of perverse anxiousness (according to Agamben) to play with and explore the operative principle of ethics and the concept of virtue as obligation and duty that medieval theology had granted it in heredity. The “infinite debt” which, according to the philosophers of the Second Scholasticism, consists in religious duty, is thus definitively planted into the metaphysics of modernity. With Kant the idea of an infinite task and duty appears for the first time, unreachable but not less dutiful for such. In an exemplary passage, Agamben summarizes: “Here it is clear that the idea of a ‘must-be’ is not only ethical nor merely ontological: rather, it aporetically ties being and praxis in the musical structure of a fugue where acting exceeds being not only because it always dictates new precepts to it, but also and above all because being itself has no other content than pure debt.” In the next pages, Agamben will polemically insist on interiorizing the idea of moral law, on its expansion in the form of self-control and even in the masochist pleasure of the law. “The substitution of the ‘glorious name of ontology’ with ‘transcendental philosophy’ means, in fact, that an ontology of ‘must-be’ has already lost its place as the ontology of being.”
A treatment and a conclusion that is wholly Heideggerian, one might say. And yet, we can feel it right away, this reference deludes Agamben. “Even Heidegger develops an ontology that is more complicit than one would think with the paradigm of operativity that he intends to critique.” This affirmation is shocking. Had Heidegger not gone far enough in his destruction of the ontology of modernity? Didn’t he strip the Sein of as much humanity as was possible to attribute it? No – Agamben insists – there is a point where Heidegger falls to the temptation of an operative ontology: the theory of technique and the critique of the Gesell show from this irresolution. “The metaphysical essence of technique cannot be understood if it is understood only in the form of production. It is also and above all government andoikonomia that, in their extremes, can also provisionally put casual production between parentheses in the name of more refined and diffused forms of the management of men and things.” Auschwitz teaches! Already in The Kingdom and the Glory, with a little attention, this conclusion could have been reached.
This is where I become suspicious. And what I mean is that this book, Opus Dei, although it summarizes and develops, like we’ve said, the analyses in The Kingdom and the Glory, in reality is not only the completion of the archeological thread of Agamben’s thought and work. This book rather marks Agamben’s definitive separation from Heidegger: ontological choice surpasses the archeological quality of the analysis and the clash reaches a fundamental level. Heidegger is here accused of having only managed to find a temporary solution to the aporias of being and of must-be (or rather operativity): indetermination more than separation, more than choice of another ontological terrain. I have to admit I felt a certain satisfaction in noticing this. But it was brief. What is the further inscrutable Seinthat Agamben now, against Heidegger, proposes? Already once, in the 1990s, before venturing into the long adventure of Homo Sacer, in The Coming Community Agamben distanced himself from Heidegger: at that time, he had fallen to a Benjaminian, almost Marxist, solution, in promoting a challenge against the humanistic sense of being. Now, this is certainly not the direction that Agamben continues. On the contrary, he moves against any humanism, against any possibility of action, against any hope for revolution.
But how did Agamben get here, to this radicalized nihilism, where he swims delighting in the fact he has overcome (or concluded) Heidegger’s project? He has come across a long journey that is articulated in two directions: one a truly political-judicial critique, the other an archeological one (a theological-political dig). Carl Schmitt is at the center of this journey: he guides the two directions, the one that leads to qualifying power as exception and therefore as force and destiny, an absolute instrumentation without any technical quality and the sadism of finality; on the other hand, one that leads to the qualification of potency as theological illusion, i.e. impotency, in the sense of the impossibility of relying on its effectiveness. Therefore, he incites unproductiveness, thus denouncing the necessary frustration of will, of the masochism of duty. The two go together. It is nearly impossible, recovering the actuality of the Schmittian concepts of the “state of exception” and the “theological-political”, to understand if they represent the biggest danger or instead if they are simply an opening to their truth. Metaphysics and political diagnostics surrender to indistinctness. But that would be irrelevant if this indistinctness didn’t drown any possible resistance. Let’s go back to the two identified lines: the whole journey that follows Homo Sacer develops on this double track. The second track is summarized in The Kingdom and the Glory.
We insist: this second track is also moved by Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology and by confronting Heidegger’s ontology. We say this to avoid confusing Agamben’s archeology with Foucault’s archeology. Agamben is missing history, the history that Foucault treats not only as archeology of modernity but as an active genealogy of the present, of its coming and its unraveling, of its being and its becoming. History, for Agamben, doesn’t exist. Or rather, it is at most the history of law, the only place where the philosopher can become a grammarian and analyst of the grammar of control; but certainly it is also the place where biopolitics and genealogy can present themselves only in linear terms – just like destiny, in fact. Because here not even the shadow of subjectivity, of production, appears – and it rather seems that the latter is totally removed from acting, from technique, from operating and, above all, from resistance.
Thus the legal exemplifications Agamben presents in Opus Dei as definitive proof of his thesis come as no surprise. Rendering absolute the duty of law would have been introduced by Pufendorf more than Hobbes (and this process concludes with Jean Dormat). This could be. A distant seventeenth-century history, therefore, that marches in unison with the birth and development of the Second Scholasticism (that even Heidegger owes much to!) and the definitive stabilization of a metaphysics of operation, of effective virtue. But above all this is important because, as we’ve seen, it is Kant who picks up this motif and, after Kant, Kelsen renders it absolute in the fundamental figure of legal duty, of Sollen. Remember: it isn’t so much Kelsen’s conclusion that, although affirming the relationship between law and command as dutiful, is important here; the importance lies in the fact that it uses – a thousand miles away from its first affirmation, yet living throughout “European ideology” – the internal link to liturgy that goes from economic operativity to divine being, homogeneously articulated across legal deductions, up until the Sollen’s founding necessity: all this doesn’t represent anything less than the inscrutable command of divinity. Thus, Kelsen becomes the same as Schmitt and, as was supposed to be shown, the two open lines from Homo Sacer recompose: on one side the critique of exception and, on the other, the critique of Sollen, filtered in Christian oekonomia, unite in the end. But if we can accept this reduction – in general and in a space that is no longer legal nor political; if it is true that the practice of government founded on the law of exception and on the pretext of economic effectiveness have substituted every constitutional form of government; if, as Benjamin wrote a long time ago, “what is now effective is the state of exception in which we live and that we no longer know how to distinguish from the rule”: well, if all that is true, what can free us according to Agamben? (If that question even makes sense anymore!)
So we’ve reached the end of a complex journey. We should free ourselves from the concept and potency of will: thus Agamben starts to answer the question. We have to free ourselves from will that aims to become institution, that aims to be effective and actual. We know the reasons why. In Classical Greek philosophy, the concept of will has no ontological meaning; this disfigurement is introduced by Christianity, exaggerating elements that are embryonically present in Aristotle; so duty is introduced into ethics in order to give a foundation to control; thus the idea of will is elaborated to explain the passage from potency to the act. In this way, all western philosophy is put inside a space of insoluble aporias that triumph in full modernity, redefining the world as a technological and industrial product (what is more evident of the realization, of the becoming effective of power in contemporary reality – what more than this horizon?). Once again the question arises: how can we get out? How can a being without effectuality be regained? What great enigma Agamben has given us!
There might be a way that Agamben could still explore at this point. It is found in Spinoza, i.e. a way in which potency is immediately organized as a tool for action, where violence and pleasure are determined in the institutions of the multitude and constitutive capacity becomes an effort to construct, in history, freedom, justice and the common. Agamben perceives this perfectly atheist escape route. He in fact grasps it in the insulting refusal of Spinoza’s atheism that, in a critical moment in modernity, Pufendorf and Leibniz both declare. But the being that Agamben presents to us is, for now, so black and flat, the immanence so indistinct, the atheism so far from materialist, the nihilism so sad that Spinoza really can’t play his game – even if he considers superstition any ideology of the state that is not produced by the multitude and the body (the bodies of the multitude) an intransitive foundation of freedom. Nor can Spinoza, on the other hand, wait for the forms of life in the west to reach their historical consummation (refusing in the meanwhile to act so that will doesn’t bite effectiveness). Instead, he knows how to answer the questions of action, hope and the future.
What is the Enlightment? This is the question throughout Spinoza’s philosophy, but also in Machiavelli and Marx – and, more recently, was gloriously picked up by Foucault. Against Heidegger’s ontological Nazism. Really, the only place along Agamben’s long journey where the ontological threshold of potency could be reached is when, moving the accent from the linguistic forms of historical being, the form of life separates not from abstract law but from historically determined law (i.e. from property rights), not from command in general but from the command of capitalist production and its state. Working to dissolve property rights and the laws of capitalism is the only operative nihilism that virtuous men proclaim and act upon. But Agamben discards even this hypothesis – recently in his Altissima povertà [The Highest Poverty].
How will this story end? There is a question that, facing a discourse like Agamben’s, arises again: could the form – i.e. the action or the institution – save itself from the destruction of every dutiful content? Those who, in this regard, insists on tones and anarchic negations is just as irritating as those who think that the continuity of the institution or annulling all negative action represent the conditions for a radical step forward. Instead, it is probable that, against these extremists, just like in other revolutionary periods, Anarchism and Communism – in new forms, evermore often, in the struggles crossing our century – are getting closer and closer to one another. In any case, the only certain thing is that, as in Spinoza, “The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a state, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.”

Translated by Jason Francis Mc Gimsey and edited by Matteo Pasquinelli. Originally published on il manifesto on the 24th of February 2012. The original Italian version is here.
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Opere/Works by Anselm Kiefer

Obama - Be the Change (Obama Love series) - Photo by Jeff Ellis @ Virality website


érik bordeleau - foucault anonymat - Le Quartanier, Can, 2012

érik bordeleau
foucault anonymat

L’art de vivre,
c’est de tuer la psychologie

Sans doute y a-t-il encore des gens qui ont une vie tout à fait personnelle; ils disent : «Nous étions hier chez tel et tel », ou bien : « Nous faisons aujourd’hui ceci ou cela », et ils s’en réjouissent sans qu’il soit même nécessaire que ces phrases aient encore un contenu et un sens. Ils aiment tout ce qui entre en contact avec leurs doigts, ils sont aussi « per- sonne privée » qu’il est possible ; le monde, aussitôt qu’ils ont affaire à lui, devient « monde privé » et scintille comme un arc-en-ciel. Peut-être sont-ils très heureux ; mais d’or- dinaire, cette sorte de gens paraît déjà absurde aux autres, sans qu’on sache encore bien pourquoi.
robert musil
L’homme sans qualités

La relation entre résistance politique et anonymat est plus que jamais à l’ordre du jour. Une de ses formes d’expression privilégiée ces derniers temps consiste en celle du justicier masqué agissant pour le compte du bien commun et des minorités opprimées. Qu’on pense par exemple au mouvement zapatiste et au sous-commandant Marcos, lequel, dissimulé sous son célèbre passe-montagne, peut se dire «gai à San Francisco, Noir en Afrique du Sud, Asiatique en Europe, Chicano à San Ysidro, anarchiste en Espagne, Palestinien en Israël, une femme seule dans le métro à dix heures du soir, un paysan sans terre, un gangster dans un bidonville », et de cette position ubiquitaire déclarer que quiconque lutte pour la justice sociale est un zapatiste (1)  « Nous sommes vous », affirment-ils ; et, pour des raisons à la fois obscures et poétiques, nous tendons volontiers à les croire.
Une tentative similaire de faire sienne la puissance démultiplicatrice de l’anonymat est à l’œuvre chez Anonymous, une constellation à géométrie variable d’individus et de groupes (n’importe qui peut agir en « leur » nom) luttant principalement pour la défense de la liberté d’expression et dont les premiers faits d’armes remontent à 2006. C’est probablement à eux qu’on doit l’usage désormais emblématique du masque de Guy Fawkes lors des manifestations liées au mouvement Occupy. Conspirateur anglais de la fin du seizième siècle, il a ins- piré une bande dessinée intitulée V pour Vendetta, qui a été portée à l’écran en 2006 et a connu un grand succès commercial. Dans le film, un héros solitaire sorti tout droit de l’âge shakespearien mène une violente guérilla personnelle contre un gouvernement fasciste dans un monde dystopique. À ma connaissance, c’est à Barcelone à l’automne 2006 qu’un mouvement social a une première fois repris V pour Vendetta pour son propre compte. Au cri de « Tu ne posséderas pas une maison de ta putain de vie ! » (No tendrás casa en tu puta vida !), le mouvement nommé « V para Vivienda » (vivienda, c’est le logement, le «lieu de vie») a coordonné une série d’actions directes (entre autres l’occupation d’un ikea) ainsi qu’au moins deux manifestations réunissant plu- sieurs milliers d’individus.
Le mot d’ordre d’Anonymous évoque sans ambages l’imaginaire vengeur et justicier de V pour Vendetta : « Nous sommes anonymes. Nous sommes Légion. Nous n’oublions pas. Nous ne pardonnons pas. Attendez-vous à nous voir. » Anonymous se veut ainsi l’expression d’une puissance de représailles virtuellement infinie, quelque chose comme le côté obscur et vengeur d’une multi- tude anonyme et, pour cette raison même, indénom- brable. Le caractère menaçant de la promesse de justice rétributive incarnée par Anonymous est renforcé par la référence à la parabole biblique du possédé de Gérasa. Dans cette parabole, Jésus rencontre un homme possédé à qui il demande son nom afin de pouvoir l’exorciser. L’homme possédé répond : « Mon nom est Légion, car nous sommes innombrables. » Dans le deuxième tome de leur trilogie sur l’Empire intitulé Multitude, Hardt et Negri reviennent sur cette parabole et se questionnent sur la menace que constitue l’idée d’un nombre indéfini pour tout principe d’ordre :

Pourquoi le nom du possédé est-il « Légion » ? Est-ce parce qu’il possède une grande puissance de destruction? Ou parce que la multitude qu’il recèle est capable d’agir comme un seul homme? La menace que représente réellement cette multitude démoniaque est peut-être d’ordre plus métaphysique : dans la mesure où elle est à la fois singu- lière et plurielle, elle détruit la distinction numérique elle- même. Il suffit de penser aux efforts qu’ont pu déployer les théologiens pour prouver qu’il n’existe pas plusieurs dieux mais un seul. [...] La menace qui pèse sur l’ordre politique n’en est que plus évidente : depuis l’Antiquité, la pensée politique est fondée sur la distinction entre l’un, le petit nombre et le grand nombre. La multitude démoniaque ignore toutes ces distinctions numériques. Elle est à la fois une et multiple. Le nombre indéfini de la multitude menace tous ces principes d’ordre (2 - Negri-Hardt)

La plupart des faits d’armes attribués à Anonymous consis- tent en des actions menées sur Internet. Le 24 décembre 2011 par exemple, la base de données informatique de Stratfor Global Intelligence, une agence de renseignement spécialisée dans les analyses géopolitiques et parfois surnommée « The Shadow cia », a été piratée par des hackers apparemment liés au groupe Anonymous et agissant dans le cadre de l’opération AntiSec ou « Anti Security » lancée plus tôt dans l’année par le groupe Lulz Security ou LulzSec (3). Stratfor s’est ainsi vu dérober plus de 90 000 numéros de cartes de crédit ainsi que la liste, jusque-là tenue secrète, de ses clients, parmi lesquels figurent des organismes comme le Pen- tagone, des forces de police, des banques, des univer- sités et de nombreuses grandes entreprises. En guise de cadeau de Noël, les robins des bois du cyberspace ont ensuite versé un million de dollars à diverses œuvres caritatives. Pour montrer leur bonne foi, ils ont d’ailleurs pris soin de publier des photos d’écran des transactions effectuées.

Cette première forme de rapport entre anonymat et résistance politique, qui concerne des actions subver- sives concertées et plus ou moins ponctuelles, constitue sans doute celle qui vient le plus spontanément à l’es- prit. À cet anonymat de premier degré ou stratégique, par lequel il s’agit en somme de dissimuler son identité afin de maximiser l’efficace d’une intervention, d’échapper à d’éventuelles poursuites judiciaires ou d’éviter de s’ex- poser dans des conditions considérées comme étant défavorables, s’en ajoute un deuxième, d’un type plus profond et plus difficile à saisir. Il redouble à l’occasion le premier mais ne s’y limite pas, et porte sur le mode de présence au monde de qui en fait l’expérience. Un élément singulier de l’attaque AntiSec du 24 décembre porte à croire que ses auteurs sont sensibles à cette dimension expérientielle du jeu entre anonymat et résis- tance politique : sur la page web défigurée de Stratfor, en plus d’avoir divulgué les données personnelles du directeur de la technologie de l’agence, les hackers ont affiché le texte intégral de L’insurrection qui vient, un essai politique rédigé par le Comité invisible et publié en 2007 aux éditions La fabrique et en 2009 en anglais aux éditions Semiotext(e). Le livre, devenu célèbre à la suite de l’affaire Tarnac (4) et du délirant compte-rendu que Glenn Beck en a fait sur les ondes de Fox News (5), a exercé une influence considérable à travers le monde et a trouvé des échos dans des milieux fort variés. (6) Plusieurs mouvements récents d’occupation étudiants aux États- Unis et ailleurs dans le monde ( je pense entre autres à ceux de l’université de Berkeley et de la New School for Social Research à New York en 2009) en portent clairement la marque. Le choix de publier ce texte plutôt qu’un autre est donc tout sauf anodin. Au-delà de son appel au blocage et au détournement des flux économiques (l’attaque du 24 décembre en est un exemple), l’intérêt principal de L’insurrection qui vient réside précisément dans sa tentative d’articuler les deux modes de relation entre anonymat et résistance politique qui nous intéressent ici. D’abord, sur le plan de l’organisation collective, le texte invite à « fuir la visibilité » afin de « tourner l’anonymat en position offensive » en vue d’une liberté d’action maximale. (a suivre...) 

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1. Naomi Klein, Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate, Londres, Flamingo, 2002, p. 211-212. 
2. Michael Hardt et Antonio Negri, Multitude : guerre et démocratie à l’âge de l’Empire, traduit de l’anglais par Nicolas Guilhot, Montréal, Boréal, 2004, p. 172. 
3. L’identité exacte des auteurs du piratage ainsi que la teneur politique de leur opération ont fait l’objet d’une intéressante contro- verse qui révèle le genre de problème auquel des actions menées sur le Web sous le couvert de l’anonymat peuvent être confrontées. Un tweet a d’abord été émis le 24 décembre par un groupe qui a rapide- ment revendiqué l’action au nom d’Anonymous. Mais, le 26 décembre, des cyber-activistes se disant près d’Anonymous ont vigoureusement démenti toute implication de leur part. « Le piratage de Stratfor n’est pas l’œuvre d’Anonymous. Stratfor est une agence de renseigne- ment open source (code source libre) qui publie des rapports quo- tidiens à partir de données recueillies sur Internet. [...] En tant que source pour les médias, Stratfor est protégé par la liberté de presse, un principe qu’Anonymous tient en haute estime.» (http://www. tgdaily.com/security-features/60413-anonymous-denies-stratfor-hack [consulté le 16 janvier 2012].) Le même jour, un message provenant des auteurs présumés de l’attaque répond joyeusement à cette déné- gation, dénonçant la tentative de créer des divisions internes au sein d’Anonymous et réitérant la légitimité de choisir Stratfor pour cible. «Nous espérons sincèrement que vous avez apprécié les festivités de LulzXmas jusqu’à présent. Les cadeaux déposés par le père Noël Anon sous l’arbre de LulzXmas ne font que commencer à s’accu- muler. À l’heure où nous nous parlons, ses petits assistants au pôle Nord se préparent à remplir le traîneau de bataille Lulz avec encore plus de cadeaux afin que la joie du LulzXmas dure toute la semaine. Joie qui s’exprime sous la forme de plus de 500 000 dollars qui ont été expropriés des gros bonnets clients de Stratfor.» Après avoir défendu le bilan de ses actions, le groupe rappelle que « n’importe qui peut prétendre faire partie de Anonymous, mais en raison de la nature intrinsèquement décentralisée de Anonymous, sans leadership hiérarchique, aucun individu n’est en position de décrier le manque de légitimité des opérations d’un autre groupe ou individu. (http:// pastebin.com/q5kXd7Fd [consulté le 16 janvier 2012].) 
4. Le 15 novembre 2008, neuf personnes (une dixième s’est ajoutée le 27 novembre 2009) ont été mises en examen pour « association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste». Elles ont en effet été accusées d’avoir formé une « cellule invisible » à laquelle est imputé le sabotage d’une ligne de tgv. Au cœur de l’enquête, on trouve L’insurrection qui vient, qui a été versé au dossier d’instruction et est considéré par le juge Fragnoli comme le « support idéologique» des actes perpétrés. «L’affaire Tarnac», du nom du village où résidaient certains des inculpés au moment de leur arrestation, a déclenché une importante polémique. De nombreux intellectuels et parlementaires ont dénoncé un montage policier et une instrumentalisation politique de l’affaire, la presse n’hésitant pas à parler de fiasco judiciaire pour condamner une enquête qui, à ce jour, n’a encore réussi à produire aucune preuve incriminante. C’est ainsi que le 3 décembre 2009, exaspérés par ce qu’une des inculpés décrit comme « les moyens exorbitants de l’antiterrorisme pour nous détruire », les dix individus mis en cause ont annoncé dans une déclaration commune publiée dans Le Monde qu’ils cessaient désormais de respecter le contrôle judiciaire et qu’ils allaient recommencer à se voir. Plus de trois ans après les événements, la procédure judiciaire est toujours en vigueur.
5. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKyi2qNskJc (consulté le 16 janvier 2012).
6. Pour un point de vue poétique et littéraire sur l’affaire, voir Jean-Marie Gleize, Tarnac, un acte préparatoire (Paris, Seuil, 2011, 176 p.), ou encore Tomates de Nathalie Quintane (Paris, p.o.l, 2010, 144 p.). Ces deux auteurs sont réunis dans un recueil de poésie et poli- tique au titre fort suggestif (la phrase provient du Journal de Kafka), « Toi aussi, tu as des armes » (Paris, La fabrique, 2011, 208 p.). 


Daniela Angelucci - Deleuze e i concetti del cinema - Quodlibet, Ita, Ottobre 2012

Deleuze e i concetti del cinema

Sul rapporto tra cinema e filosofia, oggi sempre più analizzato e frequentato, Gilles Deleuze si era pronunciato già nella prima metà degli anni Ottanta, scrivendo due testi ancora oggi molto attuali e discussi. Soltanto la filosofia, egli afferma, può arrivare a «costituire i concetti del cinema stesso». Ripercorrendo questi concetti, dieci in tutto, ed evitando, come diceva lo stesso Deleuze, la doppia ignominia dell’eccessiva erudizione e di un’esagerata familiarità, questo libro intende ricostruire i contenuti e l’atmosfera del suo pensiero sul cinema. Senza rinunciare a proporre, a partire dalle categorie filosofiche deleuziane, letture di particolari autori e di film significativi.

Daniela Angelucci è ricercatrice di Estetica nell’Università di Roma Tre. Dal 2006 al 2010 ha insegnato Estetica e teoria del cinema nell’Università della Calabria. Collabora con l’Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani. Tra le sue pubblicazioni: Il visibile e l’irreale. L’estetica di Hartmann (Aesthetica, 1999), L’oggetto poetico. Conrad, Ingarden, Hartmann (Quodlibet, 2004), Estetica e cinema (a cura di, Il Mulino, 2009).

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Chimères N.77 October 2012 - Chaosmose, penser avec Félix Guattari

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Ce numéro de Chimères fait suite à une lecture collective du livre de Félix Guattari Chaosmose, écrit en 1992 (Galilée) qui s’est déroulée d’octobre 2011 à mai 2012, à Mains-d’Oeuvres (Saint-Ouen), puis à la Maison Populaire (Montreuil).
Chaosmose est une proposition pour voir et faire les choses autrement, une invitation à la « mise en acte » processuelle d’une pensée transversale. Comment réaliser un numéro de revue comme une expérience qui s’inscrive elle-même dans une processualité créative ? Penser avec Félix Guattari n’est pas « penser sur », ni « penser comme », mais produire des pensée-faire, pensée-dire, pensée-signes: plutôt qu’une analyse textuelle, il s’agissait de solliciter chacun dans ce que cette lecture lui donne à penser ou favorise dans ses pratiques, qu’elles soient politiques ou cliniques, philosophiques ou artistiques. Ainsi au cours de six séances de cette « lecture en acte », le mélange des signes s’est joint au chevauchement des temps et des espaces. Présents ou à distance, cliniciens, philosophes, artistes, psychanalystes, écrivains, sociologue intervenants se sont imbriqués dans une transversalité esthétique associant l’idée, le corps, l’écoute et le mouvement. Se sont côtoyés quelques uns de ceux, amis, analystes, artistes, philosophes, qui ont rencontré l’homme, partagé ses idées et en poursuivent les pistes. Mais aussi ceux plus jeunes, qui expérimentent aujourd’hui, à partir de ses traces, l’hétérogénèse sémiotique de la « chaosmose » et nous font découvrir l’œuvre littéraire, théâtrale et cinématogaphique de Guattari lui-même — œuvre largement méconnue et dont nous présentons ici quelques extraits.


Marcel Swiboda - In Search of Lost Time-Images: Anomalous Bergsonism and the Rhythms of Bachelardian Discontinuity in Chris Marker’s La Jetée @ Rhythm & Event - London Graduate School, Uk 29 October 2011

Marcel Swiboda (University of Leeds)

Abstract: In Search of Lost Time-Images: Anomalous Bergsonism and the Rhythms of Bachelardian Discontinuity in Chris Marker’s La Jetée

A genealogical consideration of twentieth-century Continental philosophical conceptions of time – even a cursory one – would doubtless serve to problematize some the assumed intellectual affinities between numerous of the century’s key philosophical figures, affinities that so often get taken for granted, for example between the work of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, among others. One aspect of this relatively unexplored area of consideration is the potential antagonism between Bergson and Deleuze, symptomatized by an anomalous omission from the near-comprehensive filmography of Cinema books: the work of Chris Marker – in particular his 1962 cine-photographic time-travel experiment La Jetée.
While there is a growing body of secondary commentary on the undeniable correspondences between Deleuze’s and Marker’s respective considerations of time, little has yet been written regarding how the omission of this film from Deleuze’s explorations of cinematic time – in particular in Cinema 2: Time-Image – raises questions regarding the remit of Deleuze’s adaptation of Bergson’s work with regard to film, not least given that La Jetée is a ‘film’ primarily comprised of ‘still’ photographic images and thus potentially problematizes Deleuze’s privileging of the ‘mobile section’ and claims he makes for the liberation of ‘continuous’ time in post- Second World War cinema.
As has recently been demonstrated by Steve Goodman, among other thinkers and writers, the current re-emergence of Bachelardian conceptions of time – not in place of but alongside those of Bergson and Deleuze – evidently offers a lot of potential for conceptually and pragmatically nuancing contemporary debates in this area, as well unearthing some of the problems inherent in unequivocally affirming Deleuze’s ‘Bergsonian’ approach, as warned against by Alain Badiou. This paper proposes to explore these transversal links between Deleuze, Bergson and Bachelard through a case-based consideration of Chris Marker’s La Jetée, with a primary emphasis on the role of Bachelard’s ‘rhythmanalysis’ might play in deepening the exploration of time with regard to Marker’s cinematic experiment and to philosophical and theoretical considerations of the temporal event in cinema and media culture more broadly. 

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